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THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES: A CASE STUDY
David J. Padilla

INTRODUCTION
On behalf of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR or Commission) of the Organization of American States (OAS), I wish to thank Professors Claudio Grossman and
Daniel Bradlow for their kind invitation to participate in the "Conference
on the Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Private Actors in International Law." I would also like to thank my employer, the OAS, for
allowing me to participate in today's panel discussion. The views I ,,ill
express are based on my eighteen years with the OAS and my dozen
years at the IACHR. Of course, all opinions and mistakes are mine
alone.
Since its inception in 1959,' the Commission has offered a unique
forum in the Western Hemisphere for the presentation of individual and
collective denunciations of human rights violations by private individuals, attorneys, and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Some of the very first complaints presented to the Commission in the
early 1960s were brought by victims and family members who had
* Assistant Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. I
wish to thank my colleague, Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, for her research assistance in preparing this Article.

1. Final Act, OAS Official Records, OEA/ser.CII.5, p. 10; see CEC LIA M.
QUIROGA, TiE BATrLE OF HtMAN RiGHTS: GRoss, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS AND
THE IER-AMiERICAN SYSTEM 67 (recounting that the Organization of American

States' Fifth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held Aug.
12-18, 1959, in Santiago, Chile created the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights through the adoption of Resolution VIII).

For materials providing constitutive and procedural rules. consult INTER-AEMCAN CONMSsION ON HUMAN RiGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENrs PERTAiNNG TO HUMAN
RIGHTS rN THE INTER-AmERICAN SYS'mr,
OEA/ser. LJVIII.82, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter BASIC DoCMeNTS].
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suffered human rights violations by the dictators of that era: Castro,

Trujillo, Somoza, and Stroessner.2 Initially, however, the Commission
was merely a creature of a resolution adopted by the foreign ministers
of the OAS member states.3 The Commission's initial statute4 was weak
and did not even empower the Commission to send individual communications to governments or oblige them to respond and explain what had
transpired in given cases.'
The Second Special Inter-American Conference remedied this defect in
1965 when it amended the Commission's statute, empowering it to
receive and process individual petitions alleging human rights violations. 6 The new statute carried the concomitant duty for accused mem-

2. See QUIROGA, supra note 1, at 189-91 (1988) (describing the initial complaints to the Commission against Cuba); id. at 71-72 (describing the initial complaints against the Dominican Republic); id. at 222-23 (describing the initial complaints against Nicaragua); id. at 72 (describing the initial complaints against Paraguay).
3. See Final Act, supra note 1, at 10 (relating to the resolution); see also
QUIROGA, supra note 1, at 67-68 (noting that the initial draft resolution contained two
provisions: the formulation of substantive standards for human rights and the establishment of a commission to improve government regard for human rights). Some delegates argued that a commission should not promote human rights until there was
general agreement among the member states regarding what rights deserved protection.
Id.Compromise resulted in a Commission authorized to study human rights conditions
without lacking the power to interfere with state treatment of individuals. Id. at 6970.
4. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 9, GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES & HUMAN RIGHTS, 1960-1967 601, 605 (1972) [hereinafter GENER-

AL

SECRETARIAT].

5. See QUIROGA, supra note 1, at 67 (recounting the origins of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights). Some of the founding states opposed authorizing the Commission to adjudicate specific complaints against states. Id. at 69-70.
Consequently, the authorizing Statute granted the Commission the power to sponsor
studies and conferences but denied it the power to hear individual complaints. Id.
Still, individual petitioners asked redress of the initial Commission, and the first commissioners worked to expand their recognized powers to include hearing individual
and collective human rights complaints against specific countries. Id. at 71-76.
6. See GENERAL SECRETARIAT, supra note 4, at 601 (describing the meeting
of the Second Special Inter-American Conference held November 17-30, 1965 in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil which strengthened the Commission's statute by adopting Resolution
XXII, "Expanded functions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights").
The amended text provided the Commission with explicit authority "[tlo examine
communications submitted to it and any other available information, so that it may
address to the government of any American State a request for information . . . so
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ber states to respond to such petitions. The statute also authorized the

Commission to publish resolutions containing conclusions and recommendations on petitions once the Commission had completed the necessary fact-finding.7
The widespread use of the IACHR as a complaint forum by private

actors dates from the early 1970s when military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay engaged in large-scale repression. The Commis-

sion became a vehicle for the presentation of denunciations and the
issuance of condemnations of this repression!B The same era gave birth
to a host of human rights NGOs and saw the professionalization of a

growing cadre of sophisticated human rights advocates who learned to
use the tools of this emerging field of international law to represent
victims and their families.
The NGOs had different areas of interest and concentration. Some,

like Amnesty International, were global in scope. Others, such as
Americas Watch, were regional. Some, like the Washington Office on
Latin America (WOLA), focused on lobbying and informing public
opinion. Others, for example, the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales
(CELS) in Argentina, were essentially national, at least at the beginning.

Still others, like FEDEFAM (The Federaci6n Latinoamericana de
Asociaciones de Familiares de Desaparecidos), which sought to combat
the forced disappearances of individuals, and the Madres y Abuelas de

la Plaza de Mayo, which advocated for children of victims, became
specialized. There are secular NGOs as well as church-based organizations, like the Vicaria de Solidaridad in Chile. Some, like the Anti-Slav-

that it may make recommendations . .. with the objective of bringing about a more
effective observance of fundainental human rights . . . 2, Id. See generally Report of
the Work Accomplished During Its First Session, OEA/ser. L/V/II., doe. 32 (1961)
(noting that the Commission itself played a role in strengthening its authority through
interpretation).
7. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 18, reprinted in BASIC DOCUmENTS, supra note 1, at 98 [hereinafter Statute].
8. See generally Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina,
OEA/ser. LIVIII.49, doe. 19 corr. 1 (1980) (reporting on the abuses in Argentina);
Report on the Status of Human Rights in Chile, OEA/scr. LJV/1I.34, doe. 21 (1974)
(reporting on the human rights conditions in Chile following the military coup against
President Allende); Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile,
OEA/ser. LJV/H.37, doe. 19 corr. 1 (1976) (updating Chile's human rights conditions);
IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, OEA/ser. LJVIIA0.
doe. 10 (1977) (updating Chile's human rights conditions); Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Uruguay, OEA/ser. LIVIII.49, doe. 19 corr. 1 (1978) (reporting on
human rights abuses in Uruguay) [hereinafter IACHR Reports].
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ery League, are older, and in recent times, new ones have emerged, like
the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), in the field of
litigation to provide specialized services.
All of the organizations I have just mentioned, and hundreds more,
have dealt with, and availed themselves of, the services of the Commission. In their capacity as pleaders, the NGOs have performed a number
of discrete functions. These include:
1. presentation of complaints;
2. investigation, including the presentation of testimony of witnesses
and other evidence;
3. advocacy in the course of hearings before the Commission;
4. assistance in the conduct of on-site visits;
5. negotiations aimed at friendly settlements;
6. service as legal advisors to the Commission in litigation before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American

Court);
7. presentation of amicus curiae briefs and oral arguments in
connection with requests for advisory opinions as well as
contentious cases brought to the Inter-American Court;
8. requests for provisional measures in serious and urgent cases in
order to avoid irreparable harm to persons;
9. monitoring compliance with Commission recommendations and
Court decisions in terms of remedies; and
10. lobbying the political bodies of the OAS.
One reason for the pervasive influence of the NGO community in the
IACHR system has been the creation of coalitions and networks that
have become truly transnational in scope.9 Thus, today a victim can
present a complaint to a human rights NGO in the victim's home country and, once duly investigated and verified, the matter might well be
argued before the Commission and eventually the Inter-American Court
by an international team of lawyers from the Americas and elsewhere.
To gain a better understanding of the Commission and its forum
functions vis-A-vis private pleaders, I think it would be useful to separate the various functions I have just listed and provide real life examples by way of illustration.

9.

See David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy, Fact-Finding by Nongovernmen-

tal Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HuMAN RIGHTS 186, 187-88 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1982) (discussing the cooperation that

enables NGOs with limited resources to complement each other in persistence and
flexibility). The pervasive presence of a loose network of NGOs around the world
reduces the likelihood that mistreatment will remain undiscovered and unpublicized. Id.
_,

,I-
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I.

PETITIONS

Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides
that:
Any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization [of American States], may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violations of this Convention by a State Party."
This right is matched by a corresponding duty on the part of state
parties to provide information requested by the Commission when it
determines that the complaint is admissible." Similarly, for those OAS
member states that have yet to ratify the American Convention (twentyfive of the thirty-five OAS member states have ratified),'2 the
Commission's Statute, a binding instrument adopted by a unanimous
General Assembly vote, provides that:
In relation to those member states of the Organization that are not parties
to the American Convention on Human Rights, the Commission shall
have the following powers, in addition to those designated in Article 18:
b) to examine communications submitted to it and any
other available information, to address the government of
any member state not a Party to the Convention for
information deemed pertinent by this Commission, and to
make recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about more effective observance of
fundamental human rights ... "

10. American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in BAsIC DOCUMENrS,
supra note 1, at 1 [hereinafter American Convention]. The American Convention.
signed at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San Josd,
Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force on July 18, 1978. Id.
11. American Convention art. 48, supra note 10, at 42; see also id. art. 41 at
40 (delineating as a Commission function the ability to request information from
member states concerning human rights measures they have adopted); id. art. 43 at 40

(providing that state parties shall provide to the Commission "such information as it
may request of them as to the manner in which their domestic law ensures the effective application of any provisions of this Convention").
12. Inter-Am. C.H.RI 315, OEA/ser. IV/IL83, doc. 14 corr. 1 (1993). The ten
member states which have not yet ratified the American Convention are Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. d
. 13. Statute art. 20, reprinted in BAsic DOCUMNTs, supra note 1, at 99.
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This provision obligates the Commission to act where it finds that a
complaint from any source meets the admissibility requirements contained in its rules and determines that a Convention-protected right, or a
right set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, 4 in the case of non-states parties, has prima facie been violated.

This is a truly liberal provision compared to those governing other international human rights systems.

5

Private actors become active partici-

pants in an international forum. Also, member states ipso facto voluntarily commit themselves to participate in the Commission's quasi-judicial process aimed at clarifying and, when it so determines, remedying

violations of internationally recognized human rights.
II.

INVESTIGATIONS: EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY

Private parties before the Inter-American "bar" perform the key function of investigating allegations of human rights violations. This task
generally falls to the local NGO in cooperation with victims, their next
of kin and res gestae witnesses. For obvious reasons of timing, access,
and resources, the private attorney, intrepid journalist, or local NGO is
the party most capable of visiting the scene of the violation, photographing it, videotaping or recording testimony, obtaining notarized witness
affidavits, and seeking scientific and forensic verification of the complaint. Sometimes international teams of physicians or anthropologists
supplement these investigations by conducting painstaking post mortems
of the remains of victims of human rights violations. 6

14. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (describing the rights protected
by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man).
15. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 236-39 (providing that the European
Commission of Human Rights may receive petitions from any victim against a state
party only if that state has recognized the competence of the Commission to do so);
see also G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (stating that the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations, charged with supervising implementation of the
U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is empowered to receive and consider
complaints from individuals alleging violations by state parties only if the state has
also ratified the Optional Protocol to the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
16. See, e.g., Bradley Graham, On the Track of Killings in Argentina;
American Scientist Aids Investigation, WASH. POST, June 22, 1987, at A12 (relating
that on-site post-mortems of human remains have provided evidence of atrocities in,
among other countries, Argentina and El Salvador). In Argentina, Clyde Snow, a forensics anthropologist from the United States, uncovered remains of over 9,000 victims of the former military government. Id. In El Salvador, a forensics team trained
by Snow uncovered evidence of children who were brutally clubbed and stabbed to
death by soldiers in 1981. Douglas Farah, Skeletons Verify Killing of Salvadoran
Children; Army Battalion Accused in 1981 Massacre, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1992, at
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The Commission has conducted more on-site human rights investigations than any similar body in the world. Because of the number of
complaints the Commission receives, however, it cannot and most likely
will never be able to pursue more than a small fraction of the complaints in the expeditious and thorough manner they deserve. Because
the investigation of a complaint is essential to the system, the private
human rights actor is urged to fulfill this vital function upon which all
of the various subsequent steps we shall discuss are clearly contingent.
Ill. HEAIGS
The pertinent part of Article 48 of the American Convention states:
1. When the Commission receives a petition or communication
alleging violation of any of the rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows:
e) The Commission may request the states concerned to
furnish any pertinent information and, if so requested,
shall hear oral statements or receive written statements
from the parties concerned.'"
In recent years, the Commission has set aside a number of days prior
to its biennial sessions exclusively for the purpose of hearing from
interested persons, organizations, and governments regarding human
rights questions. Although these meetings have been described as hearings, their actual character and content have varied a great deal. The
most general hearings are ex parte in nature. A few are symbolic - a
meeting with a distinguished church leader, president, or foreign minister
in which compliments are exchanged and assurances given of continuing
support for the Commission's work and the cause of human rights.
Other hearings, also ex parte, involve victims and/or their family members, often accompanied by NGO representatives who testify regarding
specific allegations. Sometimes these hearings address the general human
rights situation in a particular country or a region therein. In addition,
ambassadors and legal experts from member state governments may
appear before the Commission to underscore efforts they have taken to
assure greater protection for the human rights of their citizens.
With increasing frequency, however, Commission hearings have become formal confrontations at which petitioners and their advocates

A18.
17. American Convention art. 48.1.e., reprinted in BAsic DocUmENTr
, supra
note 1, at 43.
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make oral presentations on specific claims in the presence of diplomats
and attorneys for the denounced government. These face-to-face proceedings allow the government's representatives to hear firsthand the charges
made against the government. The Commission always invites government representatives to reply and ask questions if they wish. Commission members, and, to a lesser extent, the Commission's secretariat staff,
then ask both parties questions. The decision to hold a face-to-face
hearing is in the hands of the party seeking the hearing, whether the
party is the private pleader or the member government. Sometimes,
complainants and witnesses insist on giving their testimony in pfivate,
ex parte hearings because they fear reprisals from agents of the denounced government.
The demand for hearings before the Commission has increased markedly in recent years and, in my view, this process is beginning to bear
fruit. There are two reasons for the increase in number and quality of
hearings before the Commission. First, the return to democracy in so
many OAS member states has led to a much greater openness on the
part of governments. Democratic governments often staff the offices that
deal with human rights issues with persons who are genuinely concerned
about improving respect for human rights in their countries. Often, these
same government representatives were leading critics of the dictatorial
regimes before democracy was restored in their countries. In a number
of instances, these spokespersons were themselves victims of human
rights violations and private pleaders before the Commission during the
years of repression in their homelands. The active participation of government representatives in the international process is very promising
because these actors are often in a position to effect changes in their
own government's policies.
The second explanation for the improvement of Commission hearings
is the growing sophistication of the system's users. NGOs here and
abroad realize that hearings provide a particularly effective forum for
drawing state attention to their concerns. While Commission hearings are
private, petitioners and, sometimes, governments hold press conferences
following the hearings. These parties are, of course, at liberty to do this.
Moreover, with the consent of the parties, photographers may take pictures in the hearing room before being asked to withdraw to allow the
hearing to proceed.
Publicity, favorable or not, is the primary lever used by petitioners to
redress human rights violations. Non-governmental petitioners have often
held press conferences and issued communiques following Commission
hearings. In the future, though, governments also might choose to employ this tactic more often as friendly settlements of individual cases are
achieved.
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IV.

ON-Sr

VISTS

The pertinent part of Article 48 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. When the Commission receives a petition or communication
alleging violation of any of the rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows:
d) If the record has not been closed, the Commission
shall, with the knowledge of the parties, examine
the matter set forth in the petition or communication in order to verify the facts ... ;
2. However, in serious and urgent cases, only the presentation of
a petition or communication that fulfills all the formal requirements of admissibility shall be necessary in order for the
Commission to conduct an investigation with the prior consent
of the state in whose territory a violation has allegedly been
committed."
In 1961, the Commission conducted its first on-site visit in the Dominican Republic." In later years, the Commission had a prolonged
presence in the Dominican Republic following the 1965 invasion of that
country by the United States Marines. In the early 1960s, the Commission also conducted on-site investigations in Miami, Florida where it
interviewed Cubans fleeing persecution in the early years of the Cuban
revolution.? In fact, the creation of the Commission was in part
prompted by the situation in Cuba.2 During the 1969 war between
18.

American Convention art. 48, reprinted in BAsic DOcUbiENTs, supra note

1, at 42.
19. Report on the Situation Regarding Human Rights in the Dominican Republic 4, OEA/ser. LIV/JL4, doe. 32 (1962).
20. See Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners in Cuba 205, OEA/ser.

IV/II.7, doc. 4 (1963) (noting that the decision to conduct on-site interviews in Miami was one of practical necessity). Between November 1961 and September 1962,
the Commission submitted three written requests to the Government of Cuba for either information or consent to visit the country to conduct an investigation. Id. As the
Cuban Government did not reply, the Commission agreed in January 1963 to take
other action. Id.
Many former prisoners of the Cuban Government who had previously submitted
written complaints desired to convey their experiences orally to the Commission. Id.
Because of logistical concerns, the Commission, with the consent of the United States
Government, temporarily transferred its operations to Miami, Florida. Id. The Commission delegation interviewed more than 80 people while in Miami. Id.
21. David Padilla, The Inter-American System for the Promotion and Protection

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLT'Y

[VOL. 9:1

Honduras and El Salvador, the Commission sent members and staff to

monitor several towns in those countries, including border and refugee
areas.' The Commission also played a humanitarian role in that situation by reunifying families in a number of instancesY
Not until the 1970s and 1980s, however, did the Commission create a

more elaborate modus operandi in the conduct of its in situ investigations. ' Initially in Chile and later in Argentina, the Commission relied
greatly on the assistance of national and local NGOs and church organizations to arrange interviews with victims, witnesses, representative labor
leaders, clerics, journalists, indigenous leaders, educators, students, and
political dissidents.'
In the intervening years, the Commission has conducted more than
fifty on-site visits to sixteen member states and several countries that are
not members of the OAS. In order to interview refugees who had fled

repression in their home countries, the Commission has sent delegations
to the Netherlands, Mexico, the United States, and French Guiana.' Of

of Human Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 395, 396 (1990).
22. Mission to the Republics of El Salvador and Honduras, 1969-1970 INTERAM. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 21-25.
23. Report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in the Republics of Honduras
and El Salvador in Relation to Human Rights, OEA/ser. LV/I.22, doc. 13 rev. 1
(1970). The Commission designated a subcommittee that investigated the situation
throughout the fall of 1969. Id As a consequence of the subcommittee's on-site investigation, the Commission transmitted requests for information to the governments,
many of which concerned the detention or forced displacement of individuals resulting
in the separation of the families. Id. The subcommittee also intervened in specific
cases, requesting, for example, that the authorities allow the departure of a pregnant
woman to join her husband and the departure of a father and two sons in order to
reunite a family. Id.
24. See QUIROGA, supra note 1, at 265-69 (noting that the Commission utilized
a variety of investigatory techniques during an on-site visit to Chile from July 22 to
Aug. 2, 1974).
25. See IACHR Reports, supra note 8; see also Shirley Christian, Chile Challenged on Military Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at A3 (stating that, in preparing
its report on human rights in Chile, the Commission relied on information from human rights organizations in Chile, the Roman Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity
and the human rights commission created by members of the Christian Democratic

Party).
26. See Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Suriname 3-4,
OEA/ser. L/V/II.66, doc. 21 rev. 1 (1985), (recounting that, in January 1985, the
IACHR sent a special commission to Amsterdam, the Netherlands to gather testimony
of persons claiming to be victims of human rights abuses in Suriname); see also
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 153, OEA/ser. LJ/VII.61, doe. 22 rev. 1 (1983); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala 20-21, OEA/ser. IV/II.61, doc.
47 rev. 1 (1983) (describing that in Jan. 1983, with the knowledge of the Guatemalan
Government and the consent of the Mexican Government, a Commission delegation
travelled to the Mexican state of Chiapas to interview Guatemalan refugees in seven
refugee camps, and received complaints, testimony and declarations); Inter-Am. C.H.R.
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course, before the Commission may carry out an on-site visit to a member state, it must obtain that government's invitation or consent."
During all on-site visits the Commission relies on the government to
arrange appropriate meetings with governmental authorities. Typically,
the Commission's delegation might meet with the president, the ministers of foreign relations, interior, defense, labor, and the chief of police,
among others. In addition, the Commission always obtains prior assurances from the host government regarding the delegation's freedom of
mobility, access to jails, respect for the Commission's privacy in meeting with individuals and organization leaders, and the security of the
delegation. The Commission also expects the host government to issue a
public expression that persons cooperating with the Commission will not
be subject to reprisals for having come forward to give testimony. This
cooperation is essential if an on-site visit is to prove fruitful.
At the same time, to assure a balanced presentation of all representative views, the Commission relies on local NGOs to suggest persons and
groups they believe the Commission should hear. Naturally, the Commission is master of its own work program but invariably the NGOs'
recommendations and logistical assistance in scheduling appointments
and making local travel arrangements are extremely helpful.
Over the years, the Commission has come to know the principal
human rights actors in the member states. The most respected and serious of these organizations play a crucial role in helping the Commission
to obtain a firsthand, balanced view of the human rights situation in a
particular country. These NGOs also make fact-finding in individual
cases more effective. In some countries, for instance, NGO statistics on
violence, common delinquency, and abuse of power by police and the
military have come to be accepted by the government, the citizenry, and
the human rights community as an accurate measure of the prevailing
human rights standards.'

The Commission is indebted to NGO workers who often perform
thankless, even dangerous tasks to bring human rights violations to
public attention. 9 In this regard, the Commission takes seriously its
17-18, OEA/ser. LVII.57, doec. 6 rev. 1 (1982) (stating that, in June 1982, the Com-

mission conducted two on-site visits concerning the situation of Haitian refugees in
the United States, in Miami and Puerto Rico).
27.
28.

Statute art. 18, reprinted in BASIC DOCUM.NS, supra note 1, at 98.
Padilla, supra note 21, at 401; see also Weissbrodt & McCarthy. supra

note 9, at 187, 215 (stating that, although the raw data provided by NGOs is of
extremely diverse reliability, NGOs nevertheless perform a substantial portion of the
monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in the world).

29. See Christian, supra note 25, at A3 (stating that the Roman Catholic
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duty to try to protect NGOs from acts of reprisal by agents of governments, terrorists, or criminals. Thus, the Commission has successfully
urged the OAS General Assembly to call on governments to respect the
physical integrity of private human rights monitors and the persons who
cooperate with them."

Tragically, the efforts of the Commission and the Inter-American
Court to assure respect for human rights monitors and witnesses who
have provided testimony of abuses have not always been effective.
There have been a number of instances in which these persons have
been assassinated, disappeared, or driven into exile.3' Human rights advocacy on the front lines is all too often a dangerous undertaking.
V.

FRIENDLY SETLYEMENTS

Article 48.1.f. of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes that:
1. When the Commission receives a petition or communication
alleging violation of any of the rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows:
f) The Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the
parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly
settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the

human rights recognized in this Convention."

Just as the return to democracy of so many states has had the salutary effect of making more on-site visits possible, the Commission is
beginning to see another heartening trend toward the civilized and amicable resolution of admitted human rights violations. Not unlike the
belated, but nonetheless welcome, compensation provided to Nisei Japa-

Church's Vicariate of Solidarity regularly publicizes figures on disappeared persons in
Chile); see also Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 9, at 186 (commenting that
NGOs use a variety of techniques to mobilize public opinion).
30. See Inter-Am. C.H.R. 34, G.A. Res. 1044, OEA/ser. P/XX.0.2, vol. 1
(1990) (recommending that states "grant the necessary guarantees and facilities to enable nongovernmental human rights organizations to continue contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights, and that they respect the freedom and safety
of the members of such organizations"); see also Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser.
P/XXII.o.2, vol. 1 (1990) (recording General Assembly Resolutions 1102 (1991) and
1169 (1992) which reiterate the recommended call for safety and protection of investigating NGOs).
31. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 43, OEA/ser.
L/V/III.19, doc. 13 (1988) (noting that despite an order by the Court of Human
Rights that the Government of Honduras protect several witnesses in this case, a
policeman who was scheduled to testify was killed on a Tegucigalpa street by men
who placed the insignia of a Honduran rebel movement on his body).
32. American Convention art. 48.1.f., reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note I, at 42.
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nese citizens of the United States who were interned during World War
I, there have been significant efforts made by the various branches of
democratic governments to rectify past abuses."
The most notable to date has been the friendly settlement of a series
of cases in which Argentine authorities arbitrarily detained citizens in
the 1980s under an executive decree known as the Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional (PEN). At the time, the cases were brought to the Commission
under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.' The
Commission adopted resolutions in these cases finding that the Government of Argentina had violated the prohibition against arbitrary detention contained in the Declaration, and recommended just compensation
for the victims' Not until representative democracy was restored in
Argentina, however, and the government of President Ratil Alfonsfn
ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, did the victims in
those cases, through their NGO lawyers, seek to enforce the
Commission's recommendations.' Hence, new cases were brought under the American Convention. After considerable negotiation and a number of hearings, the Argentine Congress sanctioned a law proposed by
the administration of President Carlos Menem, who had himself been
imprisoned under the PEN decree. The law provided for financial indemnities to the victims of wrongs committed years earlier.' At last,
the conciliatory and pragmatic spirit of the Convention had taken hold,
and a mature and sensitive government addressed a dark part of its
legacy in a positive and forthcoming manner.
Other efforts in this regard have also borne fruit or the promise thereof. For example, Costa Rica was recently in clear violation of an American Convention provision requiring access to an appellate court in criminal matters, until the Constitutional Chamber of its Supreme Court remedied the situation. The Costa Rican Court judicially mandated appellate
review in misdemeanor proceedings with retroactive applications, producing an amicable resolution of a long-festering problem in Costa Rican

33. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duly to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2596 (1991) (describing the aggressive efforts of Argentine President Raul Alfonsfn to prosecute past
human rights violations committed by a prior, non-democratic regime).
34. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. 18 (1948), reprinted in BAsic DOCtmflNTS, supra note 1, at 17 [hereinafter American Declaration].
35. Report No. 1/93, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, 39, OEA/ser. LJVJII.83, doe. 14
corr. 1 (1993).
36. ld. at 35.
37. Ld. at 38-39.
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jurisprudence.38
At present, another serious effort is afoot in Argentina to derogate
aspects of a press law on defamation known as desacato, which has a
chilling effect on freedom of expression. The Argentine Government has
provided written assurances that the matter will be cured soon, and, in
the process, will resolve an important case still pending before the Commission.
The friendly settlement procedures contained in the American Convention and the appropriate use of the Commission by state and non-state
parties is a very promising development, one in which the private actor
plays a crucial role. Human rights NGOs are just beginning to press for
such solutions; it is the wise and enlightened government that will capitalize on this procedure. By any measure, friendly settlement procedures
are more humane and less costly than litigation and condemnation at the
bar of public opinion.
VI.

LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE COMMISSION

In his article, Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct
Victim Representation in Human Rights Litigation,39 Professor Claudio
Grossman points to the practice of the European Court on Human
Rights in which private attorneys are permitted to argue before the European Court that individuals' human rights have been violated by states
subject to that body's compulsory jurisdiction.'
The Inter-American human rights system is modelled on the European
system. Like the European Commission on Human Rights, the InterAmerican Commission acts, for all practical purposes, as sole gatekeeper
in deciding on the admissibility of petitions, adopting reports thereon
and selecting cases to be taken to the Inter-American Court. At present,
however, private parties are not authorized to litigate contentious cases
before the Inter-American Court.' Rather, attorneys for the victims
have appeared in the capacity of legal advisors to the Commission in
contentious cases before the Inter-American Court. In addition to the
Honduran cases,' 2 in which Professor Grossman and attorneys for

38. Case 9328, 9329, 9742, 9884, 10.131, 10.193, 10.230, 10.429, 10.469,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 74, OEA/ser. LV/II.83, doc. 14 corr. 1 (1993).
39. Claudio Grossman, Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for.Direct Victim Representation in Human Rights Litigation, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
363, 389 (1992).
40. Id. at 377.
41. See American Convention art. 61.1, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 1, at 46 (stating that only states parties and the Commission may submit cases
to the court).
42. Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OAS/ser. L/V/1II.19, doc. 13
app. VI (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OAS/ser. IJV/I.21, doc. 14
(1989).
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Americas Watch played a vital role as the Commission's advisors, private lawyers are currently serving as advisors in pending cases against
Suriname, Peru, and Colombia. There are also other cases now under
consideration by the Commission for possible Inter-American Court
prosecution. Undoubtedly, NGO lawyers will participate alongside the
Commission in the capacity of advisors in the prosecution of those
cases.
As legal advisors to the Commission, NGO attorneys have played an
active role in the relatively few contentious cases the Inter-American
Court has heard. This involvement has included formulating petitions,
conducting hearings before the Commission, formulating requests that
certain matters be taken to the Court, drafting demands and memorials
to the tribunal, proposing and examining witnesses and experts, and
rendering oral arguments. The Commission's legal advisors, subject to
Commission control, have participated in every phase of the various
cases litigated to date, taking an active part in arguing on the merits and
on procedural aspects, as well as for damages demanded on behalf of
the victims. Recently, in Aloeboetoe et aL Case,"3 the Commission's
legal advisor, while contributing his services on a pro bono basis, has
asked the Inter-American Court for costs both on behalf of his sponsoring organization as well as on behalf of Moiwana'86, the Suriname
NGO which first brought the case to the attention of the Commission.
Thus, the private actor in the Inter-American system has quickly
achieved unprecedented status through participation in fora before the
Commission and Inter-American Court - a status that would not have
been dreamed of just a generation ago.
Notwithstanding these developments, however, one must ask, as Professor Grossman does, whether the private actor should not have an
even more expanded role in the system. My personal response is a
rather cautious "yes, but not right now."
At present, only two-thirds of the thirty-five member states of the
OAS have ratified the Convention, and of these, only fifteen have voluntarily accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court." One more member, Bolivia, has announced its intention to do
so, but has yet to communicate formally its decision to the OAS. Moreover, several OAS member states are seriously considering ratification of

43.

RL 57, OAS/ser. LJV/II.25, doc. 7.
Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Inter-Am. Ct. -.

app. VIII (1992).
44. Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 315,
OEA/ser. L/V/II.83, doc. 14 corr. 1 (1993).
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the American Convention. These include Antigua and Barbuda, Canada,
and Dominica. A change in administration in the United States could
also bring that state within the Convention system.
In Europe, by contrast, all the member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms45 and have accepted the jurisdiction
of the European Court. More importantly, a glance at the Commission's
recent annual and special country reports reveals a quantitatively and
qualitatively different picture regarding the volume and nature of violations in a number of OAS member states. The Inter-American system,
despite its rapid development of a comprehensive system, is still a long
way from obtaining the type of consensus which characterizes the European system.
I believe it would be imprudent if not downright risky to accelerate
and expand the role of the private actor in the conduct of contentious
cases before the Inter-American Court until and unless a substantial
majority of the OAS member states are likely to acquiesce to such
changes. Rejection of these developments could jeopardize broader acceptance by reticent member states of the OAS whose participation in
the system is essential for future progress.
At the same time, there are factors militating toward an expanded role
for private actors in litigation before the Inter-American Court. The
Commission's designation of a member as its delegate for purposes of
litigation tends to overburden that member-delegate, given the recent
increase in human rights litigation. The member-delegate shares these
tasks with a Secretariat attorney responsible for the development, research, drafting of pleadings, Inter-American Court appearances, oral
argument, and logistical preparations. This responsibility could well
threaten the Commission's human and financial capacity to bring a
sufficient number of exemplary cases to the court. Such cases are essential to create a credible deterrent against future violations and provide a
realistic avenue of redress for all but a handful of "lucky" victims.
Thus, in my opinion, it is urgent that a significant number of additional states become active participants in the Inter-American system and
accept the court's jurisdiction so that an expanded role for the private
actor can become a reality sooner rather than later. This recommendation
would also permit the increased use of litigation and the independent
functioning of private counsel before the Inter-American Court.
The Commission is now considering a proposal which could alleviate
this problem: the establishment of a specialized bar of distinguished
counsel who would be invited to represent the Commission in particular
cases on a pro bono basis. The Commission has made no firm decision

45. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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on this proposal yet, but the fact that it is being actively debated reveals
the Commission's concern regarding its own limitations and the need to
strengthen its capacity to litigate more contentious cases before the
Inter-American Court.
VII. AMicus CURIAE
Private actors and governments are not only free to, but are encouraged to provide amicus curiae briefs to the Inter-American Court in
contentious cases as well as on questions posed to the court by the
Commission or member states seeking advisory opinions. ' Many have
taken advantage of this invitation. For example, more than a dozen
amici submitted briefs to express their views before the Inter-American
Court rendered its thirteenth advisory opinion. ' Over the years, more
than 100 amicus curiae briefs have been presented to the Inter-American
Court by national, regional, and worldwide NGOs, as well as by individual attorneys, law professors, and students. On occasion, friends of
the Court have also made oral presentations in public hearings on questions that require advisory opinions. Judges of the Inter-American Court
have told me that the amici curiae have provided invaluable contributions to the court's deliberations and judgments.
In addition to NGOs and private parties, governments have also provided amicus curiae briefs. For instance, the Prime Minister of Dominica, Madame Charles, wrote an anicus brief to the Inter-American Court
on the question of "Other Treaties,'"' the subject of the Inter-American
Court's first advisory opinion. Similarly, the Government of the United
States submitted its views on the issue of the legal effects of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.! Neither of these
countries, however, had ratified the American Convention. ' Neverthe-

46. Handbook of Existing Rules, Rules of Procedure, art. 34(i), 157. OEA/ser.

TJVII.65, doc. 6 (1985) (authorizing the Inter-American Court to hear testimony or
statements that would assist in its decision-making function).
47. Opinion Consultiva OC-13/93 del 16 julio de 1993, Ciertas Atribuciones de
la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.
48. "Other Treaties," Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) No. I (providing observations
on the subject of "other treaties" pursuant to art. 52 of the American Convention).
49. Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, July 14, 1989, Interpretation of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of
the American Convention on Human Rights.

50. Following the delivery of this paper at the conference on "Changing Notions of Sovereignty", Dominica presented its instrument of ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights, signed June 3. 1993, during the General Assembly
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less, the Inter-American Court welcomes the views of non-states parties
to the American Convention.
VIII.

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

Article 29 of the Commission Regulations provides:
1. The Commission may, at its own initiative, or at the request
of a party, take any action it considers necessary for the discharge of its functions.
2. In urgent cases, when it becomes necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Commission may request that
provisional measures be taken to avoid irreparable damage in
cases where the denounced facts are true.
3. If the Commission is not in session, the Chairman, or in his
absence, one of the Vice Chairmen, shall consult with the
other members, through the Secretariat, on implementation of
the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above. If it is not possible to consult within a reasonable time, the Chairman shall
take the decision on behalf of the Commission and
shall so inform its members immediately.
4. The request for such measures and their adoption shall not
prejudice the final decision."
Article 63.2 of the American Convention states:
2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary
to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt
such provisional measures as itdeems pertinent in matters it
has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission.5"
In recent years, NGOs have petitioned the Commission on a number of
occasions to take special action in an effort to protect the lives of witnesses, family members of victims in ongoing cases, and human rights
monitors."
In response, the Commission has acted in one of two ways. The first
involves the application of Article 29 of its Regulations, which authorizes the Commission to request that the relevant government adopt special
measures to ensure the well-being of specific persons.' Usually, these
held in Managua, Nicaragua, June 7-11, 1993.
51. Regulations art. 29, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note I, at 113.
52. American Convention art. 63.2, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
1, at 47.
53. See generally Juan E. Mendez & Jose M. Vivanco, Disappearances and
the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L.
REv. 507, 528 (1990) (noting that the American Convention permits NGOs to file petitions on behalf of individuals).
54. See Regulations art. 29(l),(2), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
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requests are general, though at times they are more specific. An example
of this springs from the adoption of Argentine children whose parents
disappeared during the military dictatorship in that country. The Commission recently requested that the Government of Argentina place the
Reggiardo-Tolosa twins in the custody of guardians designated by the
children's blood relatives and that the youngsters be provided with psychological care.
The other technique the Commission uses is to petition the InterAmerican Court to issue provisional protection measures for particular
persons.' The court has granted some of the Commission's petitions,
and denied others.' In some cases, public hearings have been held in
which the moving parties, the NGOs, accompanied the Commission and
confronted the accused government's representatives before the InterAmerican Court on the issue of whether provisional measures should be
imposed or lifted, and what measures, if any, the government has taken
to give effect to the Inter-American Court's orders.

1, at 113 (providing that the Commission is authorized to take any action appropriate
to perform its role).
55. American Convention art. 63.2, reprinted in BAsic DOCUMNTs, supra note
1, at 47. Article 63.2 states:
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it
deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case
not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission.

Id
56. See, e.g., Inter-Am. CL H.R. 12, OAS/ser. L/V/1I.25, doc. 7 (1992) (petitioning the court, pursuant to article 63.2 of the American Convention and article 76
of its Regulations, for protective measures in the ChunimI case in order to protect
witnesses, relatives, surviving victims, judges, and human rights activists associated
with the Mutual Support Group (GAM) and Council of Ethnic Communities "We Are
All Equal" (CER]) in Chunim, Guatemala). The President of the Inter-American
Court, pursuant to his powers under article 23.4 of the court's Rules, issued an order
to the Government of Guatemala to adopt necessary measures to protect the life and
integrity of those named on July 15, 1991. Id The court confirmed the order of the
President on August 1, 1991. Id.at 13.
57. See, e.g., Resolutions of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of Dec. 14, 1992, Inter-Am. CL H.R. apps. IX, X, OEA/ser.
LJV.IL27/doc. 10 (1993) (denying the Commission's requests for provisional measures in two cases concerning Peru).
58. See, e.g., Chunimtl, Inter-Am. CL H.R. 52, 54, OEA/ser. L/V/III.25. doc. 7
(1992) (describing a hearing on the question of provisional measures in the Chunimu
case, in which a representative of Americas Watch served as the Commission's advisor).
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MONITORING COMPLIANCE

When the Commission determines that a violation has occurred, it

issues findings in individual reports which are published in the
Commission's Annual Report. The reports invariably contain recommendations on what measures, including compensation, the accused governments should take to rectify the violations. Similarly, when the Inter-

American Court orders an indemnification, the award of damages along
with other adopted measures are reported to the General Assembly in
the Inter-American Court's Annual Report.

Again, private actors play an active role in monitoring compliance, or
the lack thereof, with these decisions. Well-organized and respected

NGOs provide an oversight function through direct contact with the
beneficiaries of the Commission and the Inter-American Court's decisions and reports. Reports of the NGOs, duly verified by the Commission and Inter-American Court, assist in ensuring proper fulfillment of
these quasi-judicial and judicial remedies. 9 For example, the NGO

community denounced the Honduran Government for not fulfilling the
required compensatory measures ordered by the court in the Veldsquez
Rodriguez Case.'
X.

LOBBYING

Private actors in the Inter-American system also contribute to the
ongoing debate that takes place in the political organs of the OAS: the
Permanent Council,"' the General Assembly, ' and the Meetings of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers.' Ordinarily, NGOs assign representatives to present position papers and to meet with foreign ministers, ambassadors, and other diplomats in an effort to ensure that human rights

59.

See Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,

1989 (Article 63.1

American Convention on Human Rights), 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7
(issuing an opinion interpreting its decision granting compensation in the case,
Velsquez Rodriguez, Judgment of July 29, 1988, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, in which members of the NGO community denounced the Honduras Government for not fulfilling the required measures).
60. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OAS/ser. IJV/III.21 doc. 14, app. V (1989).
61. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that the Permanent Council
considers matters referred to it by the General Assembly and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs).
62. Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 2. The General Assembly, the supreme
organ of the OAS, determines general action and policy. Id.
63. Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 2. The Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs can be convened by any member state to consider urgent
problems that are of common interest. Id. The meeting may also serve as the Organ
of Consultation to consider any threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere.
Id.
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issues are given due consideration by these multilateral organs.
There is a new and promising initiative on NGO participation. Modelled after the United Nations practice in Geneva, a number of NGOs
have sought permission to play a formal and institutionalized role in
treaty drafting and standard setting. For example, a working group of
the OAS Permanent Council is in the process of preparing a draft convention on forced disappearances. A coalition of hemispheric NGOs
have sought and obtained the approval of a number of countries to
submit draft language and critique draft texts of the convention. In my
view, this is a constructive development, one that should be nurtured
and strengthened.
CONCLUSION
With some pride as a participant in the developments I have discussed, accompanied by a large dose of realism and a keen sense of the
distance yet to be travelled, I can say that in the past fifteen years the
notion of state sov6reignty and the role of private actors in the InterAmerican human rights system have undergone a sea change. While
some states argue that state sovereignty is still a sacred barrier separating governors and the governed, the facts show that state sovereignty is
not an absolute obstacle to those who seek to pursue justice responsibly.
The role of the private actor in the current system is developing and the
restoration and strengthening of democracy in the Americas must indicate that the ordinary citizen will be heard.
Finally, the active and even ubiquitous role of the private actor in the
Inter-American system should be seen as desirable - the conscious
result of the wishes of the people of the Americas and their governmental representatives who have written and ratified the instruments that
constitute our system. It is not true that the broad role played by the
private actor in the system means that the system lacks objectivity or
impartiality - that somehow the system has been captured by "activists" with a "political" agenda. Access should not be confused with
control. The organs of the system, the Commission and the Inter-American Court, are truly independent. The members and judges on these
bodies serve in their individual capacities, and not as representatives of
their states. The state still enjoys ample procedural safeguards that assure due process of law. The Commission and the Inter-American Court
however, are fora of last resort when national judicial systems are unwilling or unable to provide justice to their citizens.

